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III. 
Statement of the Case 
This is an appeal from the decision of the magistrate court regarding pre-trial motion 
issues. Please note that Trooper Talbott, the arresting officer in this matter and the operator of 
the LifeLoc breath device, is the same trooper that stopped Mr. Besaw on 21 sl Street in Lewiston 
while Mr. Beyer's stop occurred in the Lewiston Orchards. See Besaw v. ITD, Supreme Court 
Case #39759-2012 and Beyer v. ITD, Supreme Court Case #39886-2012. The LifeLoc is the 
device used in both cases. 
Party Reference 
The State is referred to as the "State" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Besaw is 
referred to by name. 
Standard of Review 
The appellate courts have determined that the standard of review ofa suppression motion 
is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the reviewing court will 
accept the trial court's findings of fact when they are supported by substantial evidence, but the 
court will freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draws factual inferences is vested with the trial court. State v. Kinser, 141 Id. 557, 
559, 112 P.3d 845, 847 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Under the 4th Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being operated 
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contrary to traffic laws. See also Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution which is the 
counterpart to the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Grigg, 149 Id. 361, 
362, 233 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Please also note the standard of review for the admissibility of an expert testimony is 
discretionary with the trial court and absent an abuse of discretion, the decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. See State v. Smith, 135 rd. 712,23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001). In addition 
on review of a decision of the District Court rendered in its appellate capacity, the court on appeal 
will review the decision of the District Court directly. The Court will examine the magistrate's 
record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions oflaw flow from those 
findings. Ifthose findings are so supported and the conclusions flow therefrom and if the District 
Court affirmed the magistrate's decision, the appellate court will affirm the District Court 
decision as a matter of procedure. State v. Healy, 151 Id. 734,264 P.3d 75 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Issues presented deal with whether the officer's actions constitute compliance with 
foundational prerequisites set out in the standards for breath testing and field sobriety tests. These 
are questions oflaw over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Carson, 133 Id. 
451, 988 P.2d 225 (CL App. 1999). 
IV. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding 
On January 16,20] 1, George Besaw, Jr., was driving in Lewiston with a Class A Idaho 
driver's license. The arresting officer, ISP Trooper Jeffrey Talbott, indicated that a white 1995 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
colored Ford FIS0 failed to maintain it's line and failed to signal southbound on 21 st Street at 
approximately 16th A venue in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, State of Idaho. The arresting officer 
recorded his contact with the vehicle and the occupants. The Court can note the weather 
conditions from the video. Trial Exhibit 7. It was cold, rainy and wet. 
The officer could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. 
The driver identified himself as George 1. Besaw, Jr. After running a record's check, the driver 
was requested to exit the vehicle to perform the standard sobriety evaluations. 
Trooper Talbott was first certified as a breath testing specialist and operator on the Lifeloc 
device in October of 2008. Motion Hearing T. at p. 31. He was re-certified in August of2010. 
Motion Hearing T. at p. 31, Motion Hearing Exhibit 1. He testified at the time of the hearing that 
after his training in August of20 1 0, new versions of SOPs were issued. The current version was 
issued in November of 2010. He did not receive any training on the SOP that was issued in 
November of 2010. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 34, 39. The trooper indicated he had no 
involvement in writing the SOP or other m311Uals generated by the ISP Forensic Services. Motion 
Hearing T. at p. 38. 
During the course ofthe hearing, the trooper was asked questions regarding the conditions 
of the area where the field sobriety tests were conducted, the slope of the parking lot where they 
were conducted, and the weather conditions. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 26-28, 108. 
The trooper conducted the horizontal gaze nystagnus walk and turn and one leg stand in 
adverse weather conditions. Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. Mr. Besaw was arrested after the field 
sobriety test were completed. He was placed in the back of the trooper's car, handcuffed with his 
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hands behind him with his feet in front of him. The trooper read him the Notice of Suspension. 
The trooper did not read the language that is in the bottom portion of the middle section of the 
advisory, the language states as follows: "THIS SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL 
OF THE EVIDENTIARY TESTeS) IS SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION 
ORDERED BY THE COURT." Motion Hearing T. at p. 90. 
The trooper read the advisory to Mr. Besaw but did not give him a copy of said form at 
the scene. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 89-90. The trooper did not video the back seat of the contact 
with Mr. Besaw until after the breath testing had been completed. Motion Hearing T. at p. 86, 
Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. The trooper indicated he was positioned outside the vehicle standing 
and bent over some of the time. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper was asked 
questions about Mr. Besaw and his CDL license and what he had advised Mr. Besaw regarding 
the license suspension for a Class A license. Motion Hearing T. at p. 91. 
During the IS-minute observation period, while the trooper was standing outside his 
vehicle with Mr. Besaw handcuffed with his hands behind him and feet forward, the trooper had 
to deal with the window wipers going, the noise of21 st Street, the interruption of Lewiston police 
officers on two different occasions and his discussion with those police officers regarding the new 
advisory form and directing them to retrieve the new advisory form from the front seat of his 
vehicle. Motion Hearing Exhibit 7, Motion Hearing T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper had to deal with 
one of the passengers getting out of the vehicle and coming towards the trooper's vehicle. Motion 
Hearing T. at pp. 97-98. The trooper had to deal with the wife of the other passenger coming 
forward to the vehicle after exiting her car which she drove to the China Inn parking lot. Motion 
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Hearing Exhibit 7, Motion Hearing T. at pp. 98-99. The trooper made eye contact with the 
Lewiston police officers, and he could not guarantee that he was bent over the whole IS-minute 
observation period. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 86-87,93-94. The trooper indicated that he had to 
yell at the passenger to stay at the vehicle. Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. 
The breath test result was a .219, insufficient, .201. Motion Hearing Exhibit 5. 
The November, 2011, SOP requires a .20 performance verification for breath tests over 
.20. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. SOP, section 5.1.3 states: 
"A performance verification of the Alca sensor and Lifeloc FC20 instruments 
using a .08 or a .20 performance verification must be performed within twenty 
four hours, before or after a evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use. 
Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification. 
Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on the use of the .20 solution in this capacity." 
Section 5.1.4 states: 
"A .20 performance verification should be run and results logged once 
every calendar month and replaced with the fresh solution approximately 
every twenty five verification or until it reaches its expiration date, which 
ever comes first. 
NOTE: The .20 performance verification was implemented for the sole 
purpose of supporting the instrument results of a 18-8004 C charge. 
Failure to timely perform a .20 performance verification will not invalidate 
tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other than 
18-8004 C." 
Section 5.1.4.1 states: "The .20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification within twenty four hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level. 
The .20 performance verification solution should be not used routinely for this purpose." The 
SOP does not have language that allows for a .08 solution to be run at "any level" like the .20 
solution. 
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The instrument log sheet for the unit used on Mr. Besaw notes that a performance 
verification was done at 4 :27 a.m. on January 16, 2011, using the .08 solution with test results of 
.073/.073, lot number 10802, bottle 0353. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. Mr. Besaw was arrested 
and charged with a DUI. 
E-mail exchanges regarding the changes in the SOP were admitted into evidence and were 
attached to the closing argument with bate stamped numbers for ease of reference. R. at pp. 198-
303. 
Mr. Besaw filed a motion to suppress. R. at p. 61. The hearing was held on May 6,2011. 
The trial court took the testimony of the arresting trooper. T. at pp. 21-134. The trial court 
entered an order denying the relief requested. R. at pp. 407-422. Mr. Besaw had a trial and was 
convicted. An appeal was made to the District Court regarding the issues set out at the hearing 
to suppress. The District Court upheld the magistrate's decision. R. at pp. 639-651. This appeal 
followed. R. at p. 652. 
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v. 
Issues Presented on Appeal 
1. Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the breath test. 
1 (a). There was a failure to comply with the standard operating procedure requirement 
of a 0.20 solution performance verification within twenty four (24) hours of Mr. 
Besaw's breath samples. 
1 (b). There was not a proper fifteen (15) minute observation period conducted. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the field sobriety test or limiting the use 
of lield sobriety tests by the State. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in its failure to find a lack of standards in breath testing as 
required by the Idaho Code § 18-8004(4). 
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THE TROOPER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT OF A 0.20 SOLUTION PERFORMANCE 
VERIFICA TION 
Mr. Besaw was arrested by Trooper Talbott on January 16, 2001. Mr. Besaw blew a 
0.219, insufficient and a 0.201 breath test. Motion Hearing Exhibit 5. The performance 
verification check was run with a O.S solution. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. Idaho Code (I.C.) § 
1S-S004( 4) requires that breath testing be run pursuant to standards developed by the ISP. The 
Court can also note the IDAPA rules that require standards be put into place. IDAPA 
11.03.01.014.03. 
The Lifeloc reference manual specifically indicates that it is not a standard. Motion 
Hearing Exhibit 2 at p. 4 of 34. The only I.C. § 1S-S004( 4) standards that are currently in place 
are found in the SOP. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. The Court can note that there are certain 
definitions found in the Lifeloc reference manual. Calibration is defined as: "In the field this 
menu is used to run performance verification checks, also known as wet checks or calibration 
checks. Actual re-calibration of the instrument is done by the ISP labs and is password-
protected". Motion Hearing Exhibit 2 at p. 9 of 34. There is a definition of performance 
verification which states: "Your agency may require that only BTS handle the performance 
verification checks. Don't attempt performance verification checks unless you have been trained 
in the proper procedure. Motion Hearing Exhibit 2 at p. 24 of 34. The Court will find none of 
this in the SOP. 
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The Court can read the manual and note what the machine is supposed to register 
regarding calibration and what was done in this particular circumstance. Motion Hearing Exhibit 
2. There is no indication of another 0.20 solution check after August 26, 2009. Motion Hearing 
Exhibit 5. 
Please review what is set out in the Lifeloc manual, Motion Hearing Exhibit 2 at page 31 
of 34. The printout (Motion Hearing Exhibit 5) is inconsistent with the SOP (Motion Hearing 
Exhibit 3). There is no verification from the Lifeloc itself that there was ever a 0.20 solution 
check after August 26, 2009. However compare with the log sheet that notes a.20 solution check 
at the beginning of the month. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. There is no explanation why the 
Lifeloc did not register the .20 solution change noted on the log sheet. 
The SOP is currently the only ISPFS standard. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. It does not 
have any definition of calibration other then noting that it is a word that is used to define a 
performance verification or simulator check. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, SOP, at p. 2 01'21. The 
Court can note there is a different procedure that is set out for minors in possession or 
consumption. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 at 19 of 21. Paragraph 8.1 has a totally different set-up 
and does not make a distinction between the breath instruments compared to paragraph 6.2. 
Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 at p. 15 of 21. Why there is a difference and why there is a distinction 
between the process that is found at 8.1 versus the process that is found in section 6.2 is not 
explained in the SOP. 
There was not a 0.20 solution verification check within 24 hours of Mr. Besaw's test. 
Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. The SOP that was in place at the time has a requirement that there be 
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a 0.20 performance verification within 24 hours. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. 5.1.4 of the SOP 
(Motion Hearing Exhibit 3) specifically notes that the 0.20 performance verification was 
implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the instruments results for an lS-S004C 
charge, in other words, a blow over .20. (emphasis added) Failure to timely perform a 0.20 
performance verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or 
in charges other then lS-S004C. (emphasis added). Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. There is no 
such rule for a 0.80 solution for an excessive breath test. It is clear that for a 0.20 blow, there 
has to be a 0.20 performance verification within 24 hours of the test. SOP rule 5.1.4.1 states, 
"The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for performance verification within 
24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level." Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 at p. 10 of 
21. 
The court must apply the rule oflenity found in State v. Mills, 128 Id. 416, 913 P.2d. 1196 
(et. App. 1996), in the application of these sections of the SOP. The whole reason for using such 
a solution is to determine the accuracy of the instrument at a OAO breath test, a 0.80 breath test, 
and a 0.20 breath test, which are all statutory limits developed by the legislature. State's Exhibit 
A. The rule of lenity must be applied requiring a .20 performance verification within 24 hours. 
See also Matter of Virgil, 126 Id. 946, 947, 895 P.2d, 82 (1995). 
The Mills court held in interpreting statutes, rules and regulations the following: "Under 
the rule of lenity, criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. (cites 
omitted) The same principle of construction that apply to statutes apply to rules and regulations 
promulgated by administrative agencies." (Cites omitted) At. p. 429. 
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In this particular circumstance, pursuant to the log sheet, the arresting officer ran a 
performance verification on the Lifeloc using the .08 solution. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. Mr. 
Besaw's breath test was noted as .219, insufficient and .201. Motion Hearing Exhibit 5. Mr. 
Besaw had an excessive breath test result and so the failure of the operator to comply with the 
standards set out by Idaho State Pol ice Forensic Services and Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) and Idaho 
Code § 18-8002A(7)( d) required the magistrate to strike the breath test. He did not do so. The 
District Court upheld the lower court's decision. R. at p. 645. 
It should also be noted that § 5.1.4.1 of the SOP specifically allows the .20 solution to be 
run for verification for any breath test result even though it is not recommended. However, there 
is no indication that .08 performance verification can be run for a 0.20 or above breath result. Use 
of the .08 solution in this case is in violation of SOP for a .20 or above breath result. It is clear 
that arresting officer/operator/breath testing specialist failed in the requirements ofthis breath test 
and performance verification. The failure to use the 0.20 solution also violates linearity which 
is discussed below in Section II. 
l(b). 
THERE WAS NOT A PROPER 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD 
CONDUCTED. 
There has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State v. Stump, 
146 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case points to the specific standard of observation 
required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761 
(CL App. 2(09). 
In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test his breath 
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alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room with Mr. Stump. 
The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any circumstances or conditions 
inside the room which might have interfered with or impaired the arresting officer's senses. 
Officer Hurt also advised Mr. Stump to tell him if he had belched or regurgitated during the 15 
minute wait. 
In Mr. Besaw's case, the arresting officer did not tell Mr. Besaw that he needed to advise 
the officer if he actually belched, burped, or the like. The sense of smell is not helpful in this 
case. What would a burp smell like, alcohol? Did not the trooper say Mr. Besaw smelled of 
alcohol? Motion Hearing T. at pp. 105-106. In Wilkinson v. lTD, 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d. 680 
(Ct. App. 2(11), the Court in footnote 4 discussed the issue of being instructed not to belch: 
At p. 684. 
"Although the officer did not do so in this case, it would enhance law 
enforcement procedures to simply ask the suspect if she belched, burped, 
vomited, or did anything else during the waiting period that might skew 
the test results. Previous cases have taken note of whether or not the 
officer addressed such type of question to a subject. See e.g. Stump, 146 
Idaho at 861, 203 P.3d at 1260; Carson, 133 Idaho at 452,988 P.2d at 
226. " 
The question of observation was before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled 
against the driver. FIowever, the Wilkinson breath test took place in a concrete room designed 
for breath testing. There were three video cameras capturing the events as they OCCUlTed. The 
hearing officer viewed these recordings before making his decision. In addition, there was 
another female officer in the room standing directly behind Wilkinson during the period of time 
Officer Davis had his back turned to Wilkinson. Wilkinson under scores the problems that are 
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found in Mr. Besaw's case regarding the observation period. Trooper Talbott did not ask 
Mr. Besaw ifhe burped, belched, or the like. The trooper did not videotape the events as was 
found in the Wilkinson case. The court does not need a Homer Simpson burp on the audio to 
question the observation period. The trooper could have video taped the testing sequence but 
chose not to. 
In the Magistrate's decision he cited to State v. Remsberg, 126 Idaho 338,882 P.2d 993, 
(Ct. App. 1994) to support his decision that the 15 minute observation period was followed. R. 
at p. 414. Ffowever the Remsberg decision isn't helpful at all if the Court looks at the at the facts 
of Rembsberg. In Remsberg, the officer transported Remsberg to the police station and 
administered two intoximeter tests which showed BAC results of and 1.5 and 1.6. The test were 
completed inside in the room designated for breath testing. Ms. Remsberg filed a motion to 
suppress which the magistrate denied. Officer Campbell in Remsberg testified that the 
observation began at 11 :23 p.m., and 22 minutes later at, 11 :45 p.m., Campbell administered the 
first intoximeter test. Two minutes thereafter he administered the second test. Campbell 
indicated during the seven minutes directly prior to administration of the first test, that he 
programed the intoximeter, waited for the machine to warn1 up, and read the advisor form with 
Remsberg while standing next to her. The record showed that Remsberg was actually seated next 
to Campbell. The court found that Campbell did not have Remsberg under "continual direct 
visual observation". The court in Remsberg found that Officer Campbell was in the same room 
with Remsberg and observed her for at least 15 minutes before administering the breath test. 
There is no indication of any outside wiper noise, rain, other officers distracting the officer from 
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observing the driver. There is no indication of other passengers disrupting the observation period. 
There is no indication of a passenger's wife coming on the scene or entering the intoximeter room 
where Ms. Remsberg was seated. So how the magistrate in Mr. Besaw's case could compare 
State v. Remsberg to the situation that Mr. Besaw found himself in on January 16,2011 is 
unknown. 
In addition, in Mr. Besaw's case, there was no video ofMr. Besaw once he was placed in 
the back of the trooper's ISP vehicle. 
In State v. Carson, 133 Id. 451,988 P.2d 225(Ct. App. 1999), the Court was faced with 
a 15 minute wait that occurred in a law enforcement vehicle while the driver was being 
transported to the Washington County Sheriffs Office to use the Intoxilyzer 5000. In that case, 
Mr. Carson was asked ifhe had belched or vomited or burped, etc. during the drive. The arresting 
officer said he intermittently observed Mr. Carson in the rearview mirror and listened for any 
indication of belching or regurgitation. The arresting officer testified that because of the late hour 
he encountered no traffic on the road and his police radio was quiet throughout the trip. The 
officer then acknowledged during cross examination that is was raining and that the windshield 
wipers were operating. The Court found that the arresting officer's attention was not devoted to 
Mr. Carlson and that evidence presented at the motion hearing and common sense, tells us that 
an officer's ability to use his hearing as a substitute for visual observation was impeded by noise 
with the automobile engine, tires on the road, rain and windshield wipers. 
In State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho. 335, 338, 144 P.3d. 40, 43 (Ct. App. 2006), a similar 
situation to Mr. Besaw's case is presented. DeFranco, the officer left the patrol car's rear door 
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open and entered through the front passenger door, called dispatch momentarily and removed his 
AlcoSensor equipment that had been on the front seat. He then walked to the rear of the vehicle, 
opened the trunk and looked through a file box to find a advisory form. 
During the 15 minute wait, Trooper Talbott was distracted by Lewiston police officers. 
There is a specific reference to him telling them to leave him alone for the next four (4) minutes. 
Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. Instead of them leaving him alone, they continued to talk to him and 
he continued to talk to them. He directed them to get the advisory forms which were in his 
vehicle. This is not a situation in which all of this is happening in an enclosed room like the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 EN at the Nez Perce County Jail. Mr. Besaw was sitting in the vehicle, the door 
was open, Trooper Talbott was standing outside talking to at least one Lewiston police officer 
regarding the advisory form. 
During the observation period and breath testing sequence, one of the passengers got out 
of the vehicle and approached Talbott's vehicle. At that time, Trooper Talbott's attention was 
directed to the passenger, due in part to officer safety since he was there by himself. His attention 
was directed away from Mr. Besaw and towards the passenger. His sight and hearing were 
directed towards someone other then Mr. Besaw. None of the case law cited herein requires that 
the Driver prove that he burped. The Driver only has to prove that the 15 minute observation 
period was not followed. 
On top of all of these distractions, in the middle of the breath testing sequence, the 
Trooper's attention was again directed away from Mr. Besaw and to the wife of one of the other 
passengers who had arrived, exited her vehicle, and approached the police vehicle. In Mr. 
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Besaw's case, there is the radio traffic from dispatch during the 15 minute wait. There is the noise 
of the window wipers. There is the noise of passing traffic. There is no indication that a person 
standing outside a vehicle, with someone sitting inside a vehicle, could smell anything such as 
a burp or the like. Again, note the weather and the likelihood of using the sense of smell. 
Obviously, the senses of touch and taste do not apply. The three senses that were applicable in 
this case were distracted or not realistically focused on Mr. Besaw during the observation period. 
The State may argue that the SOP has changed since the cases cited above were decided. 
However, has the equipment changed? Have the manufacturers recommendations changed? Has 
the science changed? Has Henry's law, the scientific foundation for breath testing, changed? The 
only thing that has changed is ISP Forensic Services' decision to make "standards" discretionary. 
The e-mails that are part of this record show why there is a change. However, there can be no 
change regarding the mandatory 15 minute waiting period. "Proper testing procedure by certified 
operators is necessary in order to provide accurate results." Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, SOP. 
The current SOP requires "at least 15 minutes of observation" Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. 
The Court has to wonder whether "should" really is discretionary when the SOP states as follows: 
"Any material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the month prior 
to the start of the 15 minute waiting period." (emphasis added) Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. IfMr. 
Besaw had an apple in his mouth or a chew soaked with alcohol or a lemon or 12 marbles, does 
the officer have discretion to allow that material to remain in the mouth during the wait period 
and during the blow. What about the following: "During the monitoring period the 
subjectlindividual should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate." 
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Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, SOP. Again, ifMr. Besaw was smoking, drinking, eating, burping, 
vomiting and regurgitating, could the breath samples be valid because the word "should" is used 
in the SOP? Prior examples of the procedure of the 15 minute wait are as follows: 
"Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be monitored 
for fifteen (15) minutes. During this time the subject may not smoke, 
drink, or chew gum, candy, food, or any tobacco product. A material 
which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth 
prior to the start of the fifteen minute waiting period." (emphasis added) 
SOP 11/2006 Paragraph 3.]. See Wheeler at p. 768. 
It is clear that this language including the "may not" and the "should" are all mandatory 
requirements. If they are not, then someone could smoke and drink during the 15 minute wait, 
and it would not have an effect on the breath test. 
The Wilkinson, supra, court indicated, being in an enclosed room with multiple cameras 
trained on the subject lends support to the position that there was not any burping, belching or 
vomiting during this time. As the Court is aware, the ISP trooper in Besaw decided not to record 
Mr. Besaw during the 15 minute wait. He could have, but he decided not too. He decided to start 
recording after Mr. Besaw's breath testing sequence was completed. His credibility is at issue like 
the officers noted in the following two cases, In the Interests of Doe, 130 Idaho 81], 815, 948 
P.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App. 1997), State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681,52 P.3d 325, (Ct. App. 2002) 
(credibility of officers who fail to record). 
The two valid breath samples were quite a distance apart, .219/.20l. The faet that the 
samples had such a wide variance supports mouth alcohol in Mr. Besaw's first breath sample. 
The log sheet notes other drivers and their breath samples which do not have the range found in 
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Mr. Besaw's case. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. (logsheet) The testing done on January 6, 2011, 
.205/.202 and .072/.073, shows a separation of 0.003, 0.001, and no separation for the testing on 
January 8, 2011, as both breath samples were 0.068. The testing of Boswell on January 16,2011, 
notes a 0.049 and a 0.046. One would have to believe that something like mouth alcohol caused 
the wide margin between the .219 and the .201 samples. There is a two minute wait after each 
breath sample so the next valid breath sample would have been four minutes later. Motion 
Hearing Exhibit 4. 
The magistrate's conclusion is not supported by the record I. The appellate courts have 
routinely reversed decisions regarding 15 minute observation periods associated with vehicles and 
being outside. The magistrate abused his discretion. The Court should remand with an 
instruction to suppress the breath test. 
II. 
THE FIELD SOBRIETY TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
The Trial Court missed the point of the argument. First of all, Idaho has never had a 
I.R.E., Rule 702 hearing on field sobriety tests. The Idaho case law regarding the HGN field 
sobriety test is suspect, but that is only part of the argument on this appeal. The Trial Court 
ignored the argument dealing with the requirements for proper field sobriety testing. The Trial 
Court should have suppressed the use of the field sobriety test because oflack of compliance with 
the National standard. State v. Bish, 947 N .E.2d 257 (Ct. App. Ohio, 2010) and State v. Ito, 978 
The magistrate stated hln the instant matter, the officer was within two to three feet of Defendant Besaw, was facing him at all times, putting 
him in a physical position that allowed him to utilize not only hIS sight but all his senses to accomplish the purpose of the monitoring period, 
which is to determine if a defendant belches, burps or vomits." R. at p. 416. 
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P .2d 19] (Hawaii App. 1999). The trial court does not address any of the specific issues about 
how the field sobriety tests were conducted on that rainy, cold January night. The Idaho Supreme 
Court would not veer away from the majority of decisions of other states on the issue of validation 
and use ofthe national standards. See People v. McKown, 924 N.E.2d 941, (Ill. 2010) and White 
v. Miller, 724 S.E.2d 768 (W.Va. 2012). 
The Court has the ability to review the video tape regarding the field sobriety test. Motion 
Hearing Exhibit 7. Attached as Exhibit "C" to the brief below are pages from the NHTSA 
Manual 2006. R. at pp. 527-544. On the horizontal gaze nystagnus, the officer's testimony was 
that Mr. Besaw's pupils did not appear to be the same size. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 100-101, 
109. The testimony indicated that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Manual 
notes: "If the eyes do not track together, or if the pupils are noticeably unequal in size, the chance 
of medical disorder or injuries the nystagnus is present". Motion Hearing T. at pp. 132-133. In 
this case, the pupil size was obviously noticeable because the arresting officer put that in his 
police report, which he testified to at the time of the hearing. Motion Hearing T. at p. 133. 
Therefore, allowing the horizontal gaze nystagnus in as evidence would be improper. The 
scientific aura behind the testing would prejudice Mr Besaw in front of a jury. With regard to the 
"walk and turn" the court can note the slope that was present. The surface was not reasonably dry, 
wasn't level and it was certainly slippery based on the amount of water that was present. The 
same can be said for the "one-leg stand". The officer had no prior experience with Mr. Besaw 
and would not know what his ability was to perform these field tests in normal conditions. It was 
raining on that January night in 2011. The court can also note the difference in what the trooper 
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was wearing and what Mr. Besaw was wearing. 
The magistrate committed error by allowing the State to use the fIeld sobriety tests on the 
grounds offoundation, relevance, and that their probative value was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. In one study, over 98% of roadside HGN tests were determined 
to be not properly conducted. See "End-Position Nystagmus as Indicator of Ethanol 
Intoxication", Science & Justice Journal 20012. See United States vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 
(D.Md. 2002) and State vs. Lasworth 42 P.3d 844 (N.M. App., 2001). The appropriate test for 
measuring the reliability of evidence is Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State vs. 
Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
questioned the precedential value of State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). The 
Gleason Court affirmed that at most the arresting officer could testify that a nystagmus may only 
be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Moreover, such evidence cannot 
be used "to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level because nystagmus does stem 
from other causes other than the ingestion of alcohol." See Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. 
The Court of Appeals decision, State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App.1996), 
cites Gleason to say that the admission of expert testimony regarding scientific evidence is 
governed by Rule 702, but goes on to "articulate the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702" discussing 
Daubert VS. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc .. 502 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.2d 469 
2 
Please note the many attachments to the written closing argument regarding the field sobriety testings failures. 
United States vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (OMd 2002), Exhibit B of closing argument. 
State vs. Lasworth 42 P3d 844 (NM App .. 2001), Exhibit C of closing argument 
Schultz vs. State of Maryland, 665 A2d 60, 77 (1995) and a study by Spurgeon Cole, Exhibit 0 of closing argument. 
The Atlidavit of Harold I' BruU in the case of United States vs. Horn, Exhibit E of closing argument 
The Affidavit ofJoel P. Wiesen, Ph.D., Exhibit F of closing argument R. at pp. 306-404. 
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(1993), for guidance. 128 Idaho, at p. 34. Such inquiry requires a preliminary assessment of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of 
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts and issues (quoting 
Daubert). (emphasis added) The Trial Court must make a preliminary assessment, factors to be 
evaluated include: "Whether the theory or technic in question can be tested, whether it has been 
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, the existence and 
maintenance of standards governing its use, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance 
within a relevant scientific community. (quoting Dauber)" Parkinson at p. 34. The Court then 
synthesized, "other courts and commentators" in listing these additional factors: 
1) The presence of safeguards and the technique, 
2) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible, 
3) The nature and breath of inferences drawn, 
4) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury, 
5) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique, 
6) The probative significance of the evidence and the circumstances of the case. 
(Cites omitted) Id. 
However, the limitation in Parkinson, "just scientific expertise" has been overruled with 
the decision in U. S. Supreme Court case, Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1169 (1999). 
In that case, the Supreme Court answered the question posed by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in 
Daubert vs. Merrell regarding scientific evidence. Answering affirmatively, in a fairly resounding 
decision, Justice Breyer authored the near unanimous decision. The Court decided "how Daubert 
applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists." Id., at p. 1171. 
Answering this question, resolved a circuit split, where several circuits, notably the Third, Fifth, 
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and Eighth had indicated that Daubert applied to all expert testimony while the Second, Ninth, 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that Daubert applies only to the admission of "scientific" expert 
testimony. The Court concluded that Daubert's strictures apply not just to "scientific" evidence, 
but to all forms of proposed expert testimony. Kumbo 119 S.Ct., at 1171, 1175. 
The Kumbo Court, in stressing the importance ofthe gatekeeping function of a trial judge, 
noted that its objective was to: 
"ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, to make certain that 
an expeli, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." 
rd., at p. 1176. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court has used a Rule 702 case-by-case test of reliability for 
admission of cxpert testimony, the Court of Appeals has used Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and 
similar factors, which include: 
a) Whether the theory or technique in question can be tested; 
b) Whether it has been subjected to peer review and pUblication; 
c) Its known or potential error rate; 
d) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; and 
e) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific 
community. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals uses the following criteria that a trial court might consider 
when analyzing scientific evidence: 
a) The presence of safeguards in the techniques; 
b) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible; 
c) The nature and breadth of inference drawn; 
d) The extent to which the basic data are veriilable by the court and jury; 
e) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; and 
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f) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case. 
State vs. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,3 P .3d 535,(App. Ct. 2(00); Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119 
S.Ct. 1169 (1999); State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647, (Ct. App. 1996). 
The field sobriety tests administered in Mr. Besaw's case do not meet the requirements 
of Daubert, Kumbo or Rule 702, nor can the arresting officer lay a sufficient foundation to admit 
such evidence. Further, Mr. Besaw has no way to confront or challenge the officer's observations 
of these presumed psychological or psychophysical reaction of eyes, therefore, such evidence 
should not be allowed. Why not perform this test with a video camera closely recording the 
actions of the officers and the person's face? 
In using the case law set out herein, the Court must determine that the field sobriety tests 
result lack reliability and do not follow the requirements of the Rule 702 standards. The factors, 
as noted, cannot be met by the State in this case. The State called no expert to provide a 
foundation pursuant to IRE 702. Tbe Court can also note cases from Kansas and Ohio. In State 
vs. Witte, 836 P.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), the Kansas Court criticized states like Idaho for accepting 
field sobriety tests based on State vs. Superior Court, 718 P. 2d 171 (Arizona). The Kansas Court 
noted: "The Idaho Supreme Court also followed the Arizona opinion. The Idaho Court noted that 
no evidence or publication had been presented that refuted the Arizona opinion." State vs. 
Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). At pp. 1118 and 1119. The Kansas Supreme 
Court went on to criticize the Arizona Court by outlining several contrary scientific studies that 
dealt with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded: "If the 
Arizona Supreme Court had had the evidence before it, it may not have held that the HGN 
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evidence satisfies the Frye admissibility requirements. The reliability of the HGN test is not 
currently a settled position in the scientific community." At p. 1121. 
The Court may be better able to understand Mr. Besaw's position by looking at Judge 
Lansing's dissenting opinion in State vs. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (CLApp. 1999). 
This case dealt with the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the foundation for the evidence allowing the breath 
result in. Judge Lansing stated: 
At p. 872. 
"To bolster its holding that this foundation suffices, the majority opinion 
relies upon several cases from other jurisdictions where the expert testimony 
was more complete. In my view, this reliance is misplaced, for expert 
testimony given in other cases cannot substitute for an evidentiary foundation 
properly presented before the magistrate." 
Judge Lansing then went on to criticize the State vs. Garrett, supra, decision. She stated: 
"Since then, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the Frye test is not to be 
utilized as the standard for admission of scientific or technical evidence. See State vs. Faught, 
127 Idaho 873, 876, 908 P.2d 556 (1995). Rather, the proper standard is stated in I.R.E. 702." 
At p. 872. Judge Lansing concluded her dissenting opinion by stating: "Thus, the admissibility 
of the Intoxilyzer 5000 test at issue here turns upon the sufficiency of the foundational testimony 
presented to the magistrate in this casc, not information contained in decisions from other 
courts." (emphasis original) At p. 872. Moreover, the Court must note that nothing in Daubert, 
Kumbo, Parkinson, and Rule 702 require the Court to admit opinion testimony that is connected 
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of an expeli. Kumbo, at 1179. 
In State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952,89 Ohio S1. 3d 421 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio Supreme 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 24 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
Court stated in discussing the field sobriety test: "The small margins of error that characterized 
field sobriety tests make strict compliance critical." At p. 956. Judge Gaskill ignored this point 
in his decision. The Court continued: "The HGN test is not the only field sobriety test that 
required special care in its administration." At p. 956. The Court concluded its holding by 
stating: "In contrast we find that strict compliance with standardized field sobriety testing 
procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly impossible in the great majority of vehicle stops in 
which the police choose to administer the test." At p. 957. 
The Court of Appeals in State vs. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210,30 PJd 988 (Idaho App., 
2001) commented on the use of an expert: "The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702." At. p. 990. The Trial Court in Mr. Besaw's case was required to 
conduct a Rule 702 Parkinson, Kumbo, hearing to determine whether or not in this particular case 
field sobriety tests are settled science, as required in Rule 702 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b). 
The magistrate failed to do so. The Court of Appeals in the Eytchison case commented on the 
change of the Federal Rule 702 regarding expert testimony. See p. 990, footnotes 1 and 2. See 
also changes to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b )(7). 
In State vs. Garrett, (supra) the Court in a plurality opinion, determined the scientific 
reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus. ChiefJustice Bakes concurred in the opinion while 
Justice McDevitt concurred in the results only. Justice Boyle filed a special concurring opinion 
rejecting the use of the ~ standard and Justice Johnson dissented. Justice Johnson advocated 
a standard of independent reliability. Justice Johnson's dissent reflects what has been done by 
the Idaho and Federal Courts in recent cases like Parkinson and Eytchison, Daubert and Kumbo. 
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In State vs. Garrett, the Court stated: "Because the reliability of a test based on a scientifically 
tested phenomenon should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we examine what other 
jurisdictions have done when HG test results are otIered as evidence in DUI cases." At p. 880. 
In Footnote 3, the Court states: "Such 'decisions' are persuasive only as they contain 
analysis and reasoning which recommend itself to this Court." At p. 880. The Garrett Court cited 
State vs. Superior Court: "We have been furnished with no publications or other authority which 
refutes the reasoned decision of the Arizona Court." At p. 881. It is submitted that Mr. Garrett's 
counsel did not provide an adequate argument regarding filed sobriety tests. Mr. Besaw should 
not be held accountable for the failures of Defendant counsel trom a 1991 decision. Justice 
Johnson, in his dissent, lists succinctly the problems of the holding of the plurality when he stated: 
At p. 885. 
"If this (the testimony of the arresting officer) establishes the reliability for 
admissibility for expert opinion based on new scientific methods, then we 
must be prepared to accept the admissibility of the results of the polygraph 
examination based on the testimony of polygraph operators, the admissibility 
of DNA tests based on the testimony of laboratory tec1micians who conduct 
the tests, and the results of other forms of 'scientific' testing based on the 
testimony of those who conduct the tests. In my view, this is not the type of 
reliability that we should require before allowing testimony of the results of 
tests conducted based on new scientific methods. The foundation should be 
laid by experts who have researched the tests and are available to testify as 
to the scientific basis for the test." (emphasis added) 
The State of Idaho has never provided said foundation with regard to field sobriety tests. 
There has never been a true Rule 702 hearing as envisioned by Daubeli, Kumbo, Parkinson, or 
Konechny. 
The magistrate in supporting his decision regarding the field sobriety test, noted "after 
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extensive analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Garrett that HGN testing is reliable, generally 
accepted in the scientific community, and admissible in DUI prosecutions for the limited purpose 
of drawing certain inferences. R. at p. 412. The court in 1991 actually did very little analysis to 
support HGN testing. No expert has ever testified regarding the reliability of the horizontal gaze 
nystagnus or any other sobriety test for that matter, or at least not that's been reported. The State 
has law enforcement officers testify as alleged experts. 
There are cases from all over the country that limit or criticize the use of the horizontal 
gaze nystagnus or field sobriety tests in general. R. at pp. 306-404. It has been noted that judicial 
notice could become a yellow brick road for judicial acceptance of bogus or at least invalidated 
scientific theories or techniques. R. at p. 189. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett accepted standards that, even in the best 
circumstances, (in the laboratory), have a 23% failure rate (HGN), a 32% failure rate (walk and 
tum) and a 35% failure rate (one leg stand). There is a well written article by Phillip B. Price and 
Sturgeon Cole in the April 21, 2001 magazine, The Champion published by the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. The authors 
criticize the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration field sobriety test validation. The 
author states: 
"There has been no attempt to establish norms for the SFST. We have no 
idea how well a sober person can perform on the SFST. How does age or 
gender affect performance? How does fatigue or practice affect 
performance? If an individual performs poorly at a .11 % BAC, how does that 
compare with his or her performance with a BAC of .OO%? Before any 
individual's performance can be considered at 'test', that particular 
individual's baseline with no alcohol must be known and factored in. 
Without answers to these basic questions, the SFST remains in the same 
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category as tarot cards." (emphasis added) 
At p. 42. 
The authors then go on to discuss the number of false arrests: 
At p. 42. 
"Of the sober individuals that were involved in the Colorado, Florida and San 
Diego studies, the officers falsely arrested 24%, 18% and 29%, respectively. 
That is an average of 23.6% false arrest rate. What this means is that if the 
SFST are used as a decision of whether to arrest an individual for an alcohol 
related offense, one out of every four sober people will be falsely arrested." 
(emphasis added) 
In the State vs. Gleason, case, no real "expert" was called. As Justice Johnson indicated 
in Garrett, the "expert" in question was the individual who conducted the test. In Gleason, Justice 
Bistline in his concurrence in result states: "The majority's bare statement that LR.E. 702 is the 
appropriate test provides no guidance to the bench and bar as to how to determine scientific 
reliability." Justice Bistline then questions the use of Rule 702 by stating: 
At p. 67. 
"Questions that corne to mind include: What level of scientific reliability, if 
any, is required before evidence will assist the trier of fact? What constitutes 
scientific reliability? How reliable does scientific evidence have to be before 
it is admissible? On whose scale do we measure the amount of reliability? 
What unit of measurement is being used'?" 
The State may argue that Mr. Besaw is trying to overturn prior precedent. The use of 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 is supported by Gleason. However, the use of a Rule 702 analysis 
is lacking, but can be expanded as required by federal case law and the Idaho cases that have 
accepted the federal court reasoning. A Trial Court must do more under its gatekeeping function 
before any field sobriety test should be allowed before a jury. 
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In State vs. Ito, 978 P .2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) the Court determined that the horizontal 
gaze nystagmus test had a 23% error rate in detecting individuals with a BAC of. 1 % or greater 
and a 35% error rate in detecting persons with a .08% BAC or greater. At p. 203. The Hawaiian 
Court cited State vs. O'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 1995). The Oregon Court noted that part of 
the training the officers had to undergo required them to ask, before administering the HGN test, 
whether the person had a head injury, was ill or was taking medication. The officer in Hawaii had 
a whole series of questions that were required to be asked before the HGN test could be required. 
Ito at p. 204. No such questions were asked of Mr. Besaw. The HaM'aiian Court noted as to 
whether the HGN test is susceptible to abuse, one of the criticisms leveled at the test is that, 
At p. 204. 
"It is wholly subjective - the police officer has no physical sample to take to 
the laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his or her expert examine 
the evidence .... [and] cannot contradict the officer's testimony[.] (Cite 
omitted), in our view, however, this concern is minimized as long as the 
HGN test results are limited solely to probable cause determinations." 
(emphasis added) 
In Mr. Besaw's case, the State does not want the field sobriety tests limited to a probable 
cause determination, but used as evidence to prove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Hawaiian Court in vacating the Trial Court's determination of probable cause on the HGN test 
noted that officers are required to check themselves "monthly with an [8x15 square template or 
cardboard with a diagonal line drawn from one corner to another to demark 45 degrees] to be sure 
that your accuracy has been sustained." Footnote 10 at p. 210. The Court also noted the 
warnings set out in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual: 
"ONLY WHEN THE TESTS ARE ADMINISTERED IN THE 
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At p. 210. 
PRESCRIBED STANDARDIZED MANNER; AND ONLY WHEN THE 
STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE SUSPECT'S 
PERFORMANCE; AND, ONLY WHEN THE STANDARDIZED 
CRITERIA ARE EMPLOYED TO INTERPRET THAT PERFORMANCE. 
IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST 
ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE VALIDITY IS COMPROMISED." 
In the trial court's opinion regarding the field sobriety test, the Court does not even 
address the issue involving the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards or any 
of the cases cited in the closing argument regarding the use of the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration or the issues regarding failures to comply with the standards set out in the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual. The magistrate used State v. Ferreira, 
133 Id. 474, 988 P.2d 700 (CL App. 1999) to support his decision regarding the issues found in 
Mr. Besaw's case. The Ferreira case is not on point. The Ferreira case dealt with a constitutional 
challenge to the expectation of privacy intruded upon by field sobriety tests and that probable 
cause was required before such tests were administered. The Ferreira case has nothing to do with 
the issues presented in this case regarding an I.R.E. Rule 702 challenge or a challenge regarding 
the standards developed by the Nationalllighway Traffic Safety Administration regarding field 
sobriety testing. 
With regard to the National Highway Safety Administration standards, the District just 
simply indicated that the standards for proper field sobriety testing were not relevant and 
unnecessary. R. at p. 648, footnote 4. The District Court indicated that it found no error on the 
part ofthe trial court for not addressing standards that are without legal affect in Idaho other than 
they had been incorporated into Idaho case law, statutes, rules, and regulations. LR.E. Rule 702 
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require science and standards. Even in the Garrett case, the court recognized the problems with 
margin of error and the circumstances under which the test is administered at the roadside and the 
fact that nystagnus maybe caused by conditions other than alcohol consumption. Garrett at p. 881. 
There is not one case in the United States that counsel could find in which appellate courts have 
not commented on or used the standards set by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration in regarding field sobriety tests. Basically the District Court is saying that these 
field sobriety tests could come in no matter what the officer did or did not do in conducting the 
field sobriety tests. What the District Court is suggesting is that a gatekeeper judge never has to 
worry about how the field sobriety tests were conducted as long as the cop says "I did them right 
and they show the requisite number of failures". This idea is not supported by one case in this 
county and is not supported by any case law in the state ofIdaho, especially considering there are 
standards that have been developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The 
standards require that if the field sobriety tests are not done based on the standards, they are not 
valid. It could not be clearer. 
In this case, the standards were not followed and the field sobriety test should be 
suppressed. The trial court simply ignored the evidence regarding the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration standards. 
III. 
ISPFS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD REQUIREMENT OF IDAHO 
CODE SECTION 18-8004(4) 
Administrative regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as 
statutes. See Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001). The court 
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indicated that when interpreting a statute or a rule, it has to be construed as a whole to get the 
intent of the Legislature or promulgating entity. The court has to use the literal words of the rule 
and the words should be given their plain, obvious and rational meaning. In Wheeler v. Idaho 
Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761 eCt. App. 2009), the court interpreted 
the use of the word "should". One would have to believe that with the e-mails that are part ofMr. 
Besaw's record, the Court of Appeals would have determined that the use of the word "should" 
was just a "weasel word" to get around any mandatory requirement. 
The court would be well served by reading Judge Lansing'S dissenting opinion. She 
commented on the fact that ISP had not formally promulgated administrative rules prescribing 
testing equipment or requirements for its maintenance and operation. She noted that the ISP 
announced its approved breath methods through SOPs, and manuals. Judge Lansing wrote that 
appellate courts have to treat such documents as "rules" for the purpose of judicial review because 
they constitute the only materials by which the ISP has acted upon the I.e. §§ 18-8002A and 18-
8004(4) authorization for breath testing standards. Judge Lansing noted: "But a "standard" that 
is merely a recommendation, and hence optional, is no standard at all - it is merely something that 
the officers maintaining and operating the Intoxilyzer 5000 may do ifthey wish or may disregard." 
At p. 388. Judge Lansing indicated that if the rules weren't mandatory, then there could not be 
any sort of standard: "This result, however, is obviously not what is intended by the ISP. The ISP 
clearly did intend to promulgate standards, not just make optional, take or leave suggestions for 
how an Intoxilyzer 5000 could be maintained and operated." At p. 389. 
Judge Lansing was wrong in this assessment oflSP. Judge Lansing notes, in footnote no. 
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7, the problem with the use of the term "approximately": "There is no need here to go into an 
analysis of the propriety of using the term "approximately" in a rule that is supposed to be setting 
defined standards, but the problems caused by its use are as obvious as the problems caused by 
the use of "should". At p. 390. 
One would have to assume that the Court of Appeals wouldn't be very happy with ISPFS 
if they had access to all of these e-mails and the fact that the people in charge ofthe breath testing 
program in Idaho simply want to use "vagueness", "weasel words", and "wiggle room". There are 
no breath testing standards based upon science. Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion will become 
the majority opinion once the court has access to these e-mails and the real thought behind the so 
called "standards" used by ISPFS. The Wheeler court reviewed the mandatory provision of the 
SOP at the time of the Wheeler ALS. Those mandatory provisions, like for the 15 minute 
observation period, are now discretionary. See Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, Section 6.1 ("should" 
instead of "must"). 
State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.26 113 (CL App. 1988) interprets I.C. § 18-8004(4). The 
statute allows alcohol results, either blood, breath or urine, to be introduced into evidence without 
an expert testifying regarding the same. The Court of Appeals stated: 
"The admissi bility of the result of a scientific test such as the blood-alcohol 
test in I.e. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which establishes the 
acceptability, validity, reliability and accuracy ofthe test and test procedures. 
In the admission of a test result for alcohol concentration the Legislature has 
concluded that certain foundational elements need not be presented at trial 
unless such elements are disputed. The Legislature has acknowledged that 
certain tests, due to a history of reliability and accuracy, are presumed to be 
valid and acceptable ... The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme which 
allows an expedient method for admitting a blood-alcohol test result into 
evidence without the need for some expert testimony ... Inherent in this 
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statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature ofthe need for 
uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result can only be the 
product of a test procedure which from previous use is known to be capable 
of producing an accurate result. This benefit is best provided by strict 
adherence to a uniform procedure. This was recognized by the Legislature and 
is apparent first, from the statutory language which provides for the test 
procedure to be determined by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 
and second, by the "shall" language mandating adherence to the standards set 
by that Department." 
At p. 39. 
The e-mails that were produced, based on freedom of information requests, regarding the 
changes to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are replete with the use of vague language, 
"wiggle room", and "weasel words3". ISP Forensic Services (ISPFS) has determined that it is 
more interested in getting past legal challenges then setting up scientific standards that will follow 
the requirements of Bell and I.e. § 18-8004(4). Also, it's clear that Skylar Anderson, who was 
under investigation by ISPFS was instrumental in adapting the SOP and reference manuals that 
were in place at the time Mr. Besaw was tested. The court can go through the e-mails and note 
that the people that are making suggestions are not scientists. There is very little science discussed 
in these e-mails that were generated regarding the changes to the SOPs. 
The court can look at the e-mail from Matthew Garnette which notes that there are a 
couple of changes he would like to make to the IDAPA rules. R. at p. 199. lie states: "They are 
fairly minor, but are causing all kinds of issues in court." Why is ISPFS worrying about court 
issues? ISPFS should be worried about scientific standards and not what makes life easier for 
3 
Note E-mails are bate stamped for ease of reference and are attached to the written closing argument. The e-mails were made part of the 
record at the hearing on May 13, 20 II 
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prosecutors, ALS hearing officers and police officers. 
There is a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the term "approximately". 
R. at p. 200. There is a discussion regarding the MIP/MIC procedure as simply being a best 
practices provision and not a standard. R. at p. 202. There is an e-mail from Eric Moody to Mr. 
Garnette, noting that he is one of the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) hearing officers. 
R. at p. 203. He notes that two (2) attorneys during oral argument noted problems with the SOP 
that was in effect for that particular set ofDUIs. The issue involved the two (2) minutes standard 
between breath samples. 
ALS hearing officers have no business making these sorts of comments or participating 
in scientific standards being developed for Idaho. ISPFS laboratory officials are not above hiding 
and cheating as noted in the Brady material. R. at p. 301. 
There is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees of the ISPFS. Mr. 
Jewkes states: 
R. at p.215. 
"I am not sure ifI dare ask, but are there any other parts ofthe SOP that 
you feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may" or 
"approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here is 
your chance:)." (emphasis added) 
It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the ":)" symbol. 
Is this the way scientists should be acting, is this the way standards are developed? 
Jeremy Johnson uses the words: " .... I am just suggesting putting in some wiggle room 
language ... " and "cases are being tossed"( emphasis added). R. at p. 212. Where is the science 
in using "wiggle room" language. The ISP concern seems to be that cases are being tossed. 
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Whether cases get tossed really isn't relevant to a discussion as to the scientific standards for 
breath testing. 
There are also discussions regarding the use of the 0.2 solution and the need for linearity. 
The only one who seems to be concerned about standards is David Laycock. He notes: "I just 
don't think this is the time to cut back on quality standards." R. at p. 213. He goes into a 
discussion about compliance with SOP. In fact, Jeremy Johnson notes: 
"It is good scientific practice to check linearity because that lends credence 
to accuracy of the numbers that the instrument generates." 
R. at p. 215. (This e-mail relates to linearity and its application to the 0.20 solution) 
Of course, then the e-mails note the ability to just put all sorts oflanguage in that protects 
the operators so that someone can come in and testify around any problems. R. at p. 216. There 
is also a discussion by Jeremy Johnston noting that a mandatory word like "must" would be 
replaced with a discretionary word like "should". Again, where is the science? What would Judge 
Lansing say about this? Jeremy Johnston uses the term "wiggle room" regarding the 0.20 
language. R. at p. 217. The term "wiggle room" is used again regarding the simulator. R. at p. 
218. Jared Olson, who is the Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor for the Idaho Prosecuting 
Attorneys Association, seems to be instrumental in making changes. Why a non-scientist 
prosecutor is involved in any process involving generating standards must be considered suspect. 
There is also a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the word "approximately". 
He notes that he thinks the word "approximately" creates ambiguity in the method and creates 
room for debate regarding when a performance verification is valid. He notes, "In this forensic 
lab, we all have strict deadlines regarding when we can use a solution and 1 think BTSs are 
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responsible enough to be held to a strict standard." R. at p. 233. 
Anne Nord, states: "I want to thank both of you for all the work you have put in on these. 
1 hope we start seeing the payoff soon and some of these issues we have been having with court 
interpretations will go away." R. at p. 237. Why is ISPFS worrying about court decisions instead 
of simply making scientific standards? It is obvious that ISPFS is not interested in science. 
ISPFS is interested in convicting DUr drivers. Christine Starr, who is a prosecutor, has also had 
input into the development ofthe standards. Her scientific background is not known. Most likely, 
she has none since she is prosecutor. Jeremy Johnston notes: "I think we should limit it to police 
officers and attorneys. Defense might try to use something in the e-mail to their advantage if they 
find about it before the officers and prosecutors." R. at p. 248. 
There is a discussion with Jeremy Johnston noting that he does not want the guidelines 
to read as mandatory because he knows some BTSs use the nuclear approach and change solutions 
if they get an initial failed series of tests. R. at p. 251. So again, how can the current SOP be 
mandatory. Standards are not guidelines. The holding in State v. Bell, (CL App. 1988), supra, 
does not support the current SOP as a standard. The current SOP is written so that nothing is 
mandatory. 
Jared Olson, asks questions about the term "calendar month" and the use of the word 
"should" and noted that the procedure is a suggestion. R. at p. 252. Jeremy Johnston decides that 
he can manipulate the requirements regarding the two samples requirement being approximately 
two (2) minutes apart. R. at p. 260. On August 24, 2010, Jesse Avery asks a question: 
"According to 5.l.2 of the Sop's there should be an air blank between the 2 verification checks 
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on a lifeloc. The lifeloc does not perform an air blank when doing a wet check. Is there something 
else we need to be doing?" R. at p. 261. Matthew Garnette notes on August 24,2010: "I just 
talked to Jared and he is going to have a few more prosecutors read the SOP over and he may 
have a few more comments." R. at p. 263. 
Again, why is ISPFS asking prosecutors for input regarding scientific standards. On 
August 25th 2010, Jared Olsen says: 
"As a disclaimer, I recognize that there is absolutely no way the SOPs can 
be constructed in a way that will not result in attacks in court. " (emphasis 
added) 
R. at p. 265. 
With regard to the August 25th e-mail, Jeremy Johnson respond. R. at pp. 265-269. The 
court can note the discussion regarding the 0.8 solution, the 0.2 solution, the term "calendar 
month" and Jeremy Johnson's concern about Clark & Feeney coming up with a "legit 
argument" for the term "routinely". Jeremy Johnston also notes: "J removed the "open door 
suggestions" and just left if [sic] vague." R. at p. 2687. Jeremy Johnson decides that he is going 
to explain the scientific standards he has developed as follows: "I thought that I had added 
enough weasel words to allow for different jurisdictions to use their own policies and beliefs to 
decide." (emphasis added). R. at p. 268. 
There is a discussion about that word "should" in that it is not being mandatory; it simply 
allows for best practices as opposed to an actual standard. R. at p. 269. 
Jared Olsen writes about the "real science" behind the changes to SOPs: 
"It would be good to get comments from some of the BTS' s, prosecutors in 
different jurisdictions and probably most importantly your own AGs who 
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could forward it on to the appellate division who could offer some excellent 
insight. I recognize this is not a requirement of ISPFS and I just want to 
reaffirm my appreciation that you would allow me to comment at all. J see 
only benefits by us working together. So thanks again, and please let me 
know if you have questions or ifJ can be of further assistance." 
R. at p. 275. 
Again, why involve prosecutors, attorney generals, and the appellate division of the 
attorney generals' office in the development of legal standards. ISPFS has not developed any 
scientific standards, it's simply developing "weasel words". The court should make a 
determination that the "standards" in place on January 16,2011, do not meet the requirements of 
I.e. § 18-8004(4) and the holding in State v. Bell, supra. Finally, the breath testing specialist and 
operator in this particular case indicated that he had not been trained or certified on the SOP that 
was put into effect on November 1,2010. Therefore, he could not meet the standards set out in 
Masterson v. Department of Transportation, 150 Idaho 126, 244 P .3d 625 (Ct. App. 20 10). 
SOP Section 5.1.4.1 regarding the 0.20 performance verification not being routinely used 
for "this purpose", has to apply to breath tests below a 0.20. What else could it possibly mean? 
The Court also has to question exactly what SOP, section 5.1.1 means. It states as follows: "The 
Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument performance verification is run 
using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or 
approved by ISPFS ." (emphasis added) Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 (SOP p. 10 of21). What does 
the use of the word "approximately" mean in the context of this provision? 
The State can not argue against the rule of lenity or common sense in the application of 
the science oflinearity in breath testing. Cases from other parts of the country also examine the 
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need for linearity in breath testing at different intoxication levels. See State v. Holland, 27 A.3d 
1212 (App. Division N.J. 2011). 
It is hard to argue that the current SOP is any sort of standard considering all of the 
"should"s and "approximately"s that are set out in this current SOP. Exhibit 3. There is no 
science behind any of the SOP changes. Attached and marked as Exhibit "A" to the reply brief 
are the prior SOPs from August 20 and 27,2010. R. at pp. 551-592. Why have there been years 
of mandatory requirements regarding the 15 minute observation period and now all of a sudden, 
Idaho has discretionary provisions regarding the 15 minute observation period. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to act as a gatekeeper regarding the field sobriety tests. Not every 
problem goes to the weight, therefore, the filed sobriety test should have been suppressed. The 
breath test should have been suppressed because of the failure to have a proper observation period 
and because of the failure to use the correct solution for performance verification. The SOP 
currently used by the ISPFS docs not comply with the requirements for scientific standards set out 
in l.e. § 18-8004(4). The trial court should have suppressed the breath results because of the lack 
of scientific standards. The case should be remanded to the trial court. 
DATED this day of August, 2012. 
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